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Abstract
We experimentally study behavior in a finitely repeated coalition formation game
played in real time. Subjects interact in groups of three, bargaining over the distri-
bution of payments which occur at regular time intervals. During a given interval,
payments occur if and only if a majority is in agreement about their allocation. Aside
from these rules, we purposefully impose little structure on the bargaining process.
We investigate the frequency and stability of different types of agreements, as well as
transitions between them. The most frequent agreement is an equal split between two
players, leaving the third with nothing. The most stable is the three-way equal split.
Transitions between agreements are frequent and generally consistent with myopic
payoff maximization. We find evidence that both fairness concerns and risk aversion
may explain the prevalence of the three-way equal split, and that loyalty can play a
role in cementing coalitions.
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1 Introduction
A large literature in economics and political science studies coalition formation as a bar-
gaining game in which a majority of players must agree on a division of an exogenously
available surplus. Most of this literature investigates situations in which the interaction
ends once a coaltion is formed. In many real-world settings, coalition formation occurs
in the context of repeated interaction over an extended period of time. Examples in-
clude the formation and maintanence of government coalitions, alliances between factions
in international or civil conflict (Nolutshungu, 1996), and firms cooperating on supply
chain management (Nagarajan and Sosˇic´, 2008). In each of these examples, the members
of a coalition reap benefits repeatedly or continuously for as long as agreement persists.
Over time, coalitions may dissolve if agreement erodes and new coalitions may be formed.
These dynamic aspects introduce new strategic considerations and raise additional ques-
tions concerning the stability of coalitions.
This paper reports on an experiment designed to study the formation and stability of
coalitions in such a setting, more specifically, in a finitely repeated three-player majori-
tarian bargaining game. The immediate goal of our research is to observe what types of
divisions arise most frequently and are most stable in this environment. The laboratory
is well suited for this because we can exclude extraneous factors such as personality traits
and control preferences through monetary rewards. The experiment ultimately serves as
a search for stylized facts that can act as a guide for future theory development. The ob-
served patterns in behavior may also help us to understand how behavior in more complex
real world settings is driven by the underlying strategic context.
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study an unstructured and repeated
multilateral bargaining game. One of our contributions is the development of a simple
computer interface that implements such an environment. In our experiment, we impose
no restrictions on the sequence of actions. All players may propose or agree to an allocation
at any point in real time. Payments occur at regular time intervals if and only if a majority
of subjects are in agreement as to their allocation. We investigate the frequency and
stability of different types of agreements, as well as studying transitions between them. In
the remainder of this section, we give an overview of the existing literature on multilateral
bargaining and explain how our approach fits into that literature.
The literature on coalition formation comprises contributions from diverse fields, including
sociology, social psychology, economics, and political science. The multitude of approaches
within both the traditions of cooperative and noncooperative game theory, testifies to the
complexity of the problem under investigation. Bargaining behavior and outcomes are
likely to be affected by subtle institutional, environmental, and personal factors. This
complexity makes experimental investigation of an unstructured environment particularly
relevant, as it can help to test and inspire theory in the face of so many reasonable
approaches.
Early theoretical contributions to the problem of coalition formation used the axiomatic
approach of cooperative game theory. The relative strength of this approach is that it
avoids the imposition of a particular structure on the bargaining process, a feature shared
by unstructured bargaining experiments. A variety of solution concepts were developed,
including the Shapley value (Shapley, 1952), kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965), nucleolus
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(Schmeidler, 1969), core (Aumann, 1961), and bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler,
1961). What these concepts imply in our bargaining environment will be detailed in
section 3.1.
In keeping with the “institution-free” spirit of cooperative approaches, early experiments
were typically unstructured. In Kalisch et al. (1996), subjects bargain face-to-face, and
the only rule imposed is that they agree by majority vote. Fiorina and Plott (1978)
follow a similar approach, arguing that this “allows (...) procedures to be essentially
endogenous and as ‘natural’ as possible (...).” Thus, these authors felt that experiments
on coalition formation should induce preferences and enforce majority rule, but otherwise
leave subjects “free to do what they want” (ibid.). One of the conclusions from such face-
to-face experiments was that personality plays an important role, with more talkative and
aggressive subjects being more successful. There are numerous disadvantages associated
with face-to-face experiments: bargaining partners can be identified, so factors such as
gender and personal appearance need to be controlled for; face-to-face communication
may be more likely to induce other-regarding concerns that interfere with monetarily
induced preferences; completely free communication allows for the influence of personality
as discussed above. These concerns suggest a role for computer-mediated experiments
which exclude face-to-face interaction.
As far as we are aware, the earliest such experiments were performed using a set of pro-
grams called Coalitions, first described in Kahan and Helwig (1971). The program was
designed to implement one-shot bargaining games in a characteristic function game frame-
work. Communication was limited to a small vocabulary, and although players could send
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messages only in a predefined order, the options a player had during their turn, and the
necessity of everybody first accepting then ratifying a coalition meant that little meaning-
ful structure was imposed. A number of papers used this program to test and compare
cooperative solution concepts with a variety of different games, for example Rapoport and
Kahan (1976) which finds support for the individually rational bargaining set model and
Horowitz (1977) for the core.1
In contrast to the axiomatic and institution-free approach of cooperative game theory,
more recent theoretical contributions have followed a non-cooperative approach. The
method is to explicitly specify a bargaining procedure as an extensive form game. The
structure of a such a game imposes strict rules regarding, for example, who may make
a proposal, when and in what order votes are taken, and so on. The most well-known
theory in this category is the legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
Despite these procedural assumptions, the BF model admits multiple subgame perfect
equilibria (Norman, 2002). Concrete predictions can therefore be derived only by impos-
ing additional behavioral assumptions which restrict the kinds of strategies employed (e.g.
symmetry and stationarity).2 The general point is that all non-cooperative models impose
rigid procedural rules on the timing of moves (offers, votes) as well as strong behavioral
restrictions regarding the strategies players employ. Together, such restrictions yield re-
sults concerning equilibrium play, the properties of which are interpreted as predictions
concerning actual behavior in real-world situations to which the theories are meant to
1Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) implements computer-mediated unstructured bargaining, but in the much
simpler bilateral case.
2Since its publication, a number of extensions and alternatives to the BF model have been developed.
A detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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apply.
Most of the recent experimental research on majoritarian bargaining is motivated as a
test of theoretical predictions of non-cooperative models. The dominant approach is to
faithfully implement all procedural aspects of these models. For example, a number of
authors have tested the predictions of the BF model by implementing, within a laboratory
environment, the precise procedural rules (extensive form game) assumed in that model
(see McKelvey, 1991; Frechette et al., 2005, Miller and Vanberg, 2013, and many others).
Within this approach, the study most closely related to our own is Battaglini and Palfrey
(2012), who implement a repeated version of the BF game, first analyzed in Kalandrakis
(2004). In all such experiments, the interaction is computer mediated in order to maintain
anonymity and to make sure that subjects cannot take actions that are not part of the
structure of the model, for example by negotiating verbal agreements.
When viewed as a test of theory, an advantage of rigidly structured experiments is that the
failure of a model’s predictions may be attributed to the failure of behavioral rather than
procedural assumptions. Another is that structured experiments are well controlled in the
sense that the range of possible behaviors is limited to a small set of easily quantifiable
action choices and the interaction is simple. A disadvantage is that the conclusions drawn
from such experiments may lack external validity, especially when the real world settings
of ultimate interest are varied and lack the rigid structure imposed by non-cooperative
models.
Not all structured bargaining experiments are intended as a test of non-cooperative the-
ories. Thus, Nash et al. (2012) implement a multilateral bargaining game which allows
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players to cede bargaining rights to another player. Despite the clearly defined structure
of the bargaining process, they also derive hypotheses from cooperative game theory, ar-
guing that in their repeated game any division can be supported as an equilibrium so
non-cooperative game theory can provide no predictions.
An intermediate approach combines the imposition of certain procedural rules with a wide
scope for individual behavior. For example, Diermeier et al. (2008) conduct relatively
free-form bargaining experiments involving communication. In contrast to the earlier
unstructured experiments, these authors impose a set of procedural rules, allowing subjects
to form ‘protocoalitions’ and negotiate freely in subgroups. This ‘in between’ method
nicely combines the openness and realism of unstructured experiments with experimental
control over substantive causal factors such as communication and some formal rules.
Consistent with this approach, we explore a setting in which we implement majority rule
but otherwise impose minimal restrictions on the sequence and timing of the making and
accepting of proposals. We maintain experimental control by imposing anonymity and
not allowing verbal communication. As discussed above, cooperative game theory is the
natural theoretical counterpart to such an unstructured environment, and it is from there
that we draw solution concepts to guide our hypotheses.
Our research contributes to the literature on group bargaining in at least two ways. First,
we can test whether findings from more structured experiments generalize to less struc-
tured environments. Second, our results exhibit regularities which in turn may inform
future modeling efforts, as suggested by Roth (1995), who argues that one goal of ex-
perimental economics should be to ‘search for facts’ that can inspire the development of
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theories.
2 Experimental Design
Our experiment implements a finitely repeated multilateral bargaining game played in
continuous time. Subjects bargain in groups of three over payments that occur once per
second when agreements are in place, i.e. payments flow almost continuously. All subjects
can propose allocations and agree to existing proposals at any time. Payments occur each
second, if and only if at least two players agree on an allocation at that time. The game
ends when a predetermined surplus is exhausted or after a total of five minutes has passed.
This feature excludes efficiency costs of delay, reflecting our interest in the frequency and
stability of coalitions rather than efficiency.
The design of an unstructured experiment mediated by computers presents two important
challenges. First, the program interface must be simple enough to be easily operated, yet
versatile enough to allow for a natural and procedurally unrestricted exchange of offers,
counteroffers, and votes. Kahan and Rapoport (1974) report that the Coalitions program
interface required several hours of training, a fact that is probably due to some extent to
the technology of that time. A second challenge is that the recording and transmission of
subjects’ decisions must not take up too much time. This is especially important if one
wishes to study bargaining over multiple rounds or an extended period of time, and also
to allow for many repetitions of each game in case learning effects play a significant role
(which is likely in a strategic environment as complex as multilateral bargaining).
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Figure 1: Screen Shot
In order to address both of these challenges, we designed a simple mouse-operated graphi-
cal interface. The bargaining set was represented in the form of a two-dimensional simplex
consisting of a finite number of circles. Each circle represents a feasible allocation of the
available (per-second) surplus. The allocation associated with a given circle was displayed
if a subject hovered over that circle with the mouse. At any time, subjects could individ-
ually select a circle by clicking on it. This was made visible on all subjects’ screens by
highlighting the chosen circle with a color associated with that player. Once selected, a
circle remained so unless and until the subject clicked elsewhere (either selecting another
circle, or outside of the simplex, in which case no circle would be selected by that subject).
Payments occurred if and only if at least two subjects were selecting the same circle at the
end of a one second time interval. In what follows, we refer to the first click on a circle
as a “proposal” and the second click on an already occupied circle as an “acceptance” of
that proposal.
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The game ended when a predefined aggregate number of points had been allocated or after
a total of five minutes had passed. In our experiment, the surplus was always exhausted
well within five minutes, so this deadline was never binding.
If no allocation was supported by a majority at the end of the one second time interval,
no payment occurred. Since the aggregate payment was fixed, this rule is equivalent to
‘pausing’ the game whenever there is no agreement, until a new allocation (or the previous
status quo) is agreed upon. Thus, there is no exogenously imposed pressure on subjects
to quickly arrive at an agreement. This reflects our interest in a setting where the process
of coalition formation is quick as compared to the time scale at which benefits accrue.
The total number of points available was such that the game ended after 30 seconds of
‘agreement time’.3
The experiments were conducted in the Vienna Center for Experimental Economics. 72
subjects took part, divided into 8 matching groups of 9 subjects each. Prior to the paid
games, subjects completed a tutorial, including control questions, which lasted approx-
imately 15 minutes. During the tutorial, subjects first familiarised themselves with the
interface, learning how each circle defined the points earned by each player. The then in-
teracted with simulated computer players which were programmed to select random circles
to help understand how agreements could be formed. Onscreen and printed instructions
can be found in Appendix A.
The game was repeated 20 times with stranger matching. (We will refer to these repetitions
3To better understand the rules of the game, the reader may wish to view a replay of one of the actual
games which can be found at http://homepage.univie.ac.at/James.Tremewan/Research/simplex.wmv.
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as rounds). One randomly chosen round was paid, and subjects received a 3 EUR show-up
fee. The total surplus being divided was worth 36 Euros (360 ‘points’). Not including the
show-up fee, subjects earned between 0 EUR and 24,50 EUR, with a standard deviation
of 4 EUR. By definition, average earnings were 12 EUR. Games lasted for 30-60 seconds
and sessions lasted approximately one hour.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
3 Frequency and Stability
Our analysis will be structured around sets of divisions of the per-second surplus that
are suggested by concepts from cooperative game theory.4 Each of these divisions can be
motivated in a number of different ways, however we are not interested in distinguishing
between theories but rather in identifying divisions of interest which will be useful for
testing the hypotheses outlined later in this section. The three sets of divisions we consider
are:
Two-way splits: These divisions are ”coalitionally rational”5, i.e. no subcoalition of an
existing coalition can enforce a division that improves its collective payoff.6
Even two-way splits: The three even two-way splits comprise the bargaining set. Roughly
4Nash et al. (2012) follow a similar approach.
5Aumann and Maschler (1961)
6Note that this requirement is less stringent than for the core, which allows for deviations by any
coalition. The core here is empty.
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speaking, this is the set of divisions where any profitable deviation by a subset of a coalition
can be followed by another profitable deviation where the original deviators are worse off
and those they abandoned are no worse off. It is also the kernel and nucleolus, and focal
in that it is an equal division among members of a minimum winning coalition.
The three-way even split : This is the Shapley value: each player earns the average of what
they could contribute to all possible coalitions. It is also focal as an equal division among
all players.
3.1 Hypotheses
We study two properties of divisions: their frequency and their stability. Frequency is
defined as the proportion of time spent in a particular type of division. This is of interest
because it tells us what type of division we are likely to see if we inspect a game at any
given point in time. Stability is simply the average length of a type of division in seconds.
We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Focal divisions (Even two and three-way splits) are (a) more common, and
(b) more stable than non-focal divisions.
Hypothesis 2 Two-way splits are (a) more common, and (b) more stable than 3-way
splits.
Hypothesis 3 Even splits are (a) more common, and (b) more stable than uneven splits.
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Proportion of time Average Length
Division Type Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20
4 - 4 - 4 0.21 0.20 3.74 6.34
6 - 6 - 0 0.21 0.31 1.98 2.01
Uneven Two-Way 0.25 0.35 1.63 1.55
Uneven Three-Way 0.33 0.14 1.61 1.40
Two-Way 0.46 0.66 1.77 1.73
Three-Way 0.54 0.34 2.07 2.56
Table 1: Frequency and stability of divisions
3.2 Results
Table 1 summarizes the proportion of time spent in different types of divisions, as well as
their average duration. These statistics constitute simple measures of the frequency and
stability of agreements, respectively. The data are split into early (1-10) and late (11-20)
rounds of the experiment. Figure 2 shows the distribution of coalition durations for each
category of agreement.
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Figure 2: Distribution of coalition durations (seconds)
As Table 1 reveals, both the frequency and stability of different divisions change over
time. In particular, we see that three-way splits become more rare and two-way splits
more common. This pattern is driven especially by a decline in uneven three-way splits.
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It is worth emphasizing that the majority of the points in the simplex are uneven three-
way splits (see Figure 1). In the final rounds of the experiment, the vast majority of
agreements occur either at the very center of the simplex (4 − 4 − 4) or on one of the
borders (two-way splits). This suggests that subjects are learning either to split equally
in a ‘grand’ coalition, or to form minimum winning coalitions and completely exclude
one player. Another observable pattern is that the stability of three-way even splits (as
measured by the length of time that they last) increases substantially in later rounds.
Given these visible learning effects, our empirical analysis will focus on the last ten rounds
of the experiment. We will indicate in footnotes if results differ substantially when the
earlier rounds are taken into account. As we are looking at multiple and sometimes
overlapping categories of divisions, all comparisons are either between two of the sets
of divisions we have identified as being of interest, or between one of these sets and its
complement (i.e. all other types of divisions). For example, we may compare the length
of time spent in three-way even splits either to that spent in two-way even splits, or to
the time spent in any division that it not a three-way even split.
All frequency comparisons are adjusted for the number of circles in the simplex that belong
to each set under consideration. For example, there are three even two-way splits (6−6−0,
6 − 0 − 6, and 0 − 6 − 6). If three times as much time is spent in even two-way splits as
in the single even three-way split, both types of divisions are considered equally frequent.
Statistical significance is based on two-tailed binomial tests using the eight independent
matching groups as units of observation. This means that a relationship holding in seven
out of eight groups implies significance at p = 0.07, and in all eight groups at p < 0.01.
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Coming back to Table 1, we see that one fifth of the time is spent in three-way even splits,
which are the most stable types of divisions, lasting 6.34 seconds on average. They are
significantly more frequent (p = 0.07) and stable (p = 0.07) than the average over all other
types of divisions. Even two-way splits account for 31% of the time and are the second
most stable type of division, lasting 2.01 seconds on average. These divisions are also
significantly more frequent (p < 0.01) but not more stable (p = 0.29) than the average
over all other types of divisions.7 A fortiori, the set of focal divisions, which includes both
three- and two-way equal splits, is both more frequent and more stable than the set of all
non-focal divisions (p < 0.01).
Result 1 Consistent with hypothesis 1, focal divisions (Even two and three-way splits)
are (a) more common, and (b) more stable than non-focal divisions.
Two-thirds of the time is spent in two-way splits, which is significantly more than three-
way splits (p < 0.01)8, but there is no difference in average length. Focusing on even
splits, while there is no difference in frequency, even three-way splits are more stable than
even two-way splits (p = 0.07).
Result 2 Consistent with hypothesis 2, (a) Two-way splits in general are more common
than three-way splits, but this does not hold when focusing on even splits. (b) Even three-
way splits are more stable than even two-way splits.
7Looking at all 20 periods, even two-way splits are more stable than the average over all other types of
divisions (p = 0.07).
8There is no difference in the aggregate data.
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With regards to Hypothesis 3, we have already made comparisons between, even three-way
splits and other types of divisions. Confining attention to two-way splits we see that such
divisions are both more frequent (p < 0.01) and more stable (p = 0.07)9 when the division
is equal.
Result 3 Consistent with hypothesis 3, even splits are (a) more common, and (b) more
stable than uneven splits. This also holds when considering only two-way splits.
In summary, we see that most of the time (86%) is spent at one of the divisions identified
by a cooperative solution concept. Overall, 2/3 of the time is spent in two-way splits,
i.e. at circles somewhere along the edges of the simplex. 10 Interestingly, the set of
uneven two-way splits (edges minus two-way even splits) accounts for the largest amount
of time of any category. Conditional on being on an edge, more time is spent at uneven
than at even splits. Despite the complete symmetry of our experimental setup, we thus
see a substantial amount of (temporary) agreement on uneven divisions within minimum
winning coalitions. This pattern hints at the transition dynamics that occurred in the
experiment, an issue to which we turn in the next subsection.
9p < 0.01 in the aggregate data.
10This is significantly larger than the time spent at two-way splits in the first 10 rounds (46%), which
suggests that subjects learned over time to build ‘minimum winning coalitions’ (p < 0.01).
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4 Transition Dynamics and Individual Behaviour
Having established patterns in the frequency and stability of different types of divisions,
we now delve deeper into the underlying causes of these results by investigating individual
behaviour and the transitions between divisions that are generated. We begin by stating
hypotheses regarding the rationality and motivations governing subject behaviour. We
then provide an overview of the observed dynamics then formally test the hypotheses.
4.1 Hypotheses
First we examine to what degree individual behaviour is consistent with myopic11 payoff-
maximisation, testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Transitions are such that two players receive at least as much as in the
previous division.
We then consider other factors that are may be associated with certain offers being sug-
gested or accepted. The even three-way split is frequent but not coalitionally rational, so
should not be chosen by myopic payoff-maximisers. We consider two types of players who
may be attracted to this division: altruistic subjects who value its fairness, and risk averse
subjects who recognise its stability.
Hypothesis 5 Altruistic subjects are more likely to be attracted to an even three-way
11We also informally consider far-sighted payoff maximisation, but provide no statistical evidence on
this.
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split.
Hypothesis 6 Risk averse subjects are more likely to be attracted to an even three-way
split.
Finally we look at whether ‘loyalty’ plays a role in cementing existing coalitions. This
could be motivated either by positive reciprocity, or as a rational response to the higher
expected value of a coalition with a loyal partner.
Hypothesis 7 The probability of a subject accepting an offer is decreasing in the number
of offers an existing coalition member has not accepted.
4.2 Results
We begin this section with a general description of the frequency of transitions between
different types, then investigate what motivations might underlie the observed transitions.
All of the figures reported in this subsection use only data from the last ten rounds.
4.2.1 Description of Transitions
To give an overview of the dynamics without introducing an unworkable level of detail,
we will consider transitions between 11 different sets of circles: the three-way equal split,
the three 2-way equal splits, the six segments of the edge of the simplex corresponding
to uneven two-way splits, and all uneven interior circles. The main detail we lose is in
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Figure 3: Transitions from 2-way equal splits
transitions involving different types of non-focal interior circles and movements among
uneven 2-way splits on the same edge. However these account for a relatively small num-
ber of movements overall. Since we are interested in the frequency of different types of
transitions, we group ‘symmetric’ transitions in the obvious way. For example, when con-
sidering transitions from the three-way even-split to two-way even-splits, we group all such
transitions rather than distinguishing between the three possible destinations.
Figure 3 illustrates the relative frequency of transitions from a two-way even-split to the
other sets. In this and the following figures, each second that subjects remain in an
agreement is treated as a transition to itself. The 52% probability of remaining at the
equal split indicates the stability of such divisions. Conditional on moving, the majority
of transitions (≈ 58%) are to a circle on another edge of the simplex, i.e. a two-way split
between the previously excluded player and one of the previously included players. Of these
transitions, roughly half are to uneven splits which favor the previously included player.
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Figure 4: Transitions from uneven 2-way splits
This indicates that such transitions are likely initiated by the previous outsider offering a
‘better deal’ to one of the insiders. However, roughly 1/4 of transitions originating at a
two-way equal split are redistributions within the active coalition, implying a loss for one
of the included players. This is much more common than a transition to a two-way split
with the previously excluded player where the subject who is in both the old and new
coalition loses out (8%).
Figure 4 summarizes transitions from uneven 2-way splits. Again, the 50% probability
of transitioning back to the same set of circles in the next second indicates the stability
of these divisions. Conditional on moving, the most likely destination is to a 2-way split
between the excluded player and the disadvantaged included player (38% of transitions
to other sets). This is consistent with the hypothesis that these transitions are initiated
by the excluded player offering a ‘better deal’ to the ‘cheaper’ included player. However
21
Figure 5: Transitions from the 3-way equal split
we also see a substantial amount of movement to other circles, including redistributions
among the included players, mostly towards the center of the edge in question.
Finally, Figure 5 shows movements originating at the 3-way equal split. The 86% proba-
bility of remaining at this circle for another second indicates that this is the most stable
division. Conditional on moving, roughly half of the transitions are to uneven internal
circles, and half to either even or uneven 2-way splits.
4.2.2 Individual Behaviour
The majority of actions taken by subjects are consistent with myopic payoff-maximization,
that is where subjects click on a division that would give them a per-second payoff no less
than the previous agreement: 85% of offers and 75% of acceptances in the first ten rounds,
rising to 87% and 78% respectively in the final ten rounds. The smallest figure for any
22
of the eight matching groups is 72% (in both early and late rounds), so the proportion is
greater than 50% at the 1% level.
Result 4 Consistent with hypothesis 4, The majority of actions taken by subjects are
consistent with myopic payoff-maximization.
An interesting question is whether subjects can improve their long-term prospects by
taking a short-term loss. For example a subject receiving seven points while their coalition
partner receives five may wish to redistribute one of their points to their partner because
they recognise the two-way split as being more stable. In order to approach this question
in a tractable way we make the assumption that the transitions between outcomes are a
Markov process: the probability of moving to a particular division is assumed to depend
only the current division.12
We estimate the Markov process using the empirical frequency of transitions, making the
further assumption that symmetric transitions occur with the same probability (e.g. the
probability of moving from any one of the two-way even-splits to either of the others is
estimated using the average number of all such transitions). Using the estimated proba-
bility matrix we can calculate the expected payoff after any number of seconds given the
current division.
Figure 6 shows the difference between the cumulative expected payoffs starting in all types
of two-way splits and receiving the average of four points per second. Short term pain for
long term gain would be seen if the lines cross. This happens marginally for the second
12We will test the Markov assumption later in this section.
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Figure 6: Expected long-term payoffs associated with divisions
and third lines from the bottom, meaning taking 10 rather than 11 is rational in the long
term. In all other cases behaving myopically also maximises long run payoffs.
The question arises as to why subjects may take actions contrary to their immediate
self-interest. Fairness concerns can underlie two types of common transitions which must
make one of the agreeing parties worse off: transitions to the three-way equal split, and
transitions from an unequal two-way split to a more equal two-way division. An alternative
explanation for these transitions is risk-aversion which may make the even splits more
attractive if they are (correctly) perceived as more stable.
We can try to disentangle these two explanations by looking at the personal characteristics
of subjects who are instrumental in implementing three-way even splits: are they risk-
averse or fair-minded people? The first column of Table 2 display OLS regressions of the
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number of times a subject clicks on the central circle of the simplex regressed on age,
gender, score on the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005), a self-reported measure of
preference for risk13, and measures of the ”Big Five” personality traits.14 Being male, a
high score on the cognitive reflection test, and extraversion are all negatively associated
with fair clicks, whereas the opposite relationship holds for agreeableness.
One thing these regressions do not account for is the fact that some people are more active
than others so may make more fair clicks, but also more unfair clicks. The third column
of Table 2 accounts for this by using the ration of fair clicks to total clicks as a regressand.
Cognitive reflection no longer appears to be relevant for this measure, indicating that
the significant coefficients in the previous regressions resulted because subjects with a
high score on the test were less active in general (r = −0.23, p = 0.05). The effect of
extraversion disappears, but is replaced by a significant relationship with risk preferences.
Gender and agreeableness remain influential.15
Overall it appears that both fairness concerns and risk preferences play a role in making
the three-way equal split attractive to subjects. Increased social concern as measured by
”agreeableness” is associated with an increase in the number and proportion of clicks on
the fair division. People who view themselves as unwilling to take risks make a higher
proportion of fair clicks, while people identified as less extroverted make more fair clicks
13Our measure of risk aversion comes from the following question: How do you see yourself: Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Answers were on
an 11 point scale from 0 (”Unwilling to take risks”) to 10 (”Fully prepared to take risk”). This measure
has been shown to be highly correlated with incentivised risk elicitation procedures (Dohmen et al., 2011).
14The questions for the Big Five were taken from Rammstedt and John (2007).
15The second and fourth column of Table 2 come from a ”general-to-specific” approach, dropping vari-
ables with the lowest t-statistics until all remaining variables are significant. The conclusions in the main
text are unaffected.
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Table 2: Clicks on the even three-way split
VARIABLES Number of clicks Proportion of clicks
Age -0.309 0.00152
(0.427) (0.00403)
Male -7.925* -9.527** -0.0849** -0.0689*
(4.153) (3.837) (0.0392) (0.0354)
CRT -3.650** -3.677** 0.00131
(1.688) (1.566) (0.0159)
Risk 0.657 -0.0227* -0.0242**
(1.207) (0.0114) (0.00960)
BF-Extra -2.200* -2.020* -0.0157
(1.315) (1.141) (0.0124)
BF-Agree 4.654*** 4.557*** 0.0295* 0.0257*
(1.704) (1.657) (0.0161) (0.0153)
BF-Consc -0.667 0.00890
(1.157) (0.0109)
BF-Neuro 1.323 -0.00971
(1.018) (0.00961)
BF-Open 0.202 0.0113
(1.172) (0.0111)
Constant 10.72 11.32 0.0695 0.124
(19.58) (12.18) (0.185) (0.112)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R2 0.253 0.225 0.200 0.142
Notes: CRT = score on cognitive reflection test. Risk = self reported
tendency to take risks. BF = Big Five personality dimensions. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in total (as has been previously found (Becker et al., 2012) our measure of extroversion is
highly correlated with the risk question (r = 0.36, p < 0.01).
Result 5 Consistent with hypothesis 5, altruistic subjects are more likely to be attracted
to an even three-way split.
Result 6 Consistent with hypothesis 6, risk averse subjects are more likely to be attracted
to an even three-way split.
Does loyalty play a role? We approach this question by looking at the relationship between
the probability an attractive offer by one player is accepted, and the number of times the
third player has not accepted earlier beneficial offers (the variable ”prevoffs”).16 Because
in our setup offers are not made to a specific individual, we include only an offer where
a player would get more than their current per-second payoff and consider this to be an
offer to that player.17 As shown in the first of the linear probability model regressions
reported in Table 3, each additional beneficial offer not accepted by a subject’s coalition
partner is associated with a 7% reduction in the probability an offer is accepted.
In the second column we control for the number of points offered, the type of division that
was previously in place (the absence of which may have resulted in ommitted variable bias),
as well as the type of division that is suggested. The coefficient is marginally diminished,
16An alternative measure would be length of the current agreement, but this is clearly endogenous.
17It may be the case that both of the two other players would be made better off, in which case it is
included twice, in relationship to the number of offers rejected by each of the players.
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Table 3: Probability of accepting an offer (Linear Probability Models)
prevoffs -0.0677*** -0.0538*** -0.0931*** -0.0199** -0.0188** -0.0631***
(0.0146) (0.0119) (0.0205) (0.00583) (0.00760) (0.0111)
prevoffs x last10 0.0476* 0.0544***
(0.0243) (0.0151)
pointsoffered 0.0442*** 0.0445*** 0.0389*** 0.0392***
(0.00622) (0.00615) (0.00511) (0.00499)
rational 0.0543** 0.0536** 0.0143 0.0130
(0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0233) (0.0235)
even2way 0.0872** 0.0868** 0.0547** 0.0546**
(0.0311) (0.0312) (0.0224) (0.0223)
even3way 0.0141 0.0138 -0.0691 -0.0707
(0.0615) (0.0629) (0.0598) (0.0604)
prevrational -0.00885 -0.0100 -0.0140 -0.0152
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0213) (0.0211)
preveven2way 0.0265 0.0257 0.0203 0.0197
(0.0421) (0.0417) (0.0360) (0.0358)
preveven3way -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.123** -0.122**
(0.0406) (0.0395) (0.0511) (0.0504)
Constant 0.482*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.473*** 0.235*** 0.235***
(0.0431) (0.0287) (0.0292) (0.00110) (0.0432) (0.0435)
Observations 3,931 3,931 3,931 3,931 3,931 3,931
R-squared 0.011 0.075 0.076 0.001 0.040 0.041
Subject FE NO NO NO YES YES YES
Notes: prevoffs = number of earlier offers not accepted by partner in the current coalition. last10 = 1 for
offers in last 10 seconds, otherwise 0. pointsoffered, rational, even2way, even3way describe the current offer.
prevrational, preveven2way, preveven3way describe the current division. Standard errors (clustered by session)
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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but still large (5%) and highly significant.18
The regression in the third column interacts prevoffs with a dummy for the final ten
rounds to see if the effect survives learning. The estimates imply a strong effect in the
early rounds (10%) which is later much diminished (to 5%).
The final three columns include subject fixed effects to account for the possiblity that
individual effects may be correlated with prevoffs. This could arise because subjects who
have a tendency not to accept offers would be more likely to be in long-lasting coalitions,
thus their coalition partners would be more likely to receive more offers, increasing the
number that may not be accepted. The inclusion of individual fixed effects reduces the
implied effect of prevoffs, however the last regression shows a significant impact in the early
rounds (6%) which disappears in the later rounds. The substantial changes in coefficients
suggests that the OLS regression was suffering from ommitted variable bias, so we base
our conclusions on the fixed effect model.
Result 7 Partially consistent with hypothesis 7, the probability of a subject accepting an
offer is decreasing in the number of offers an existing coalition member has not accepted
for inexperienced, but not experienced, subjects.
18The regression also shows further evidence of the attractiveness of two-way splits and the stability of
even three-way splits.
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5 Conclusion
Our experimental design is motivated by the desire to strike a balance between experimen-
tal control and freedom from artificial constraints on the sequence of moves in a bargaining
process. We argue that such an environment is appropriate for testing the predictions of
non-cooperative bargaining models which impose a specific sequence of moves. The reason
is that move structures are imposed for technical reasons, to make a model tractable and
to permit the identification of specific equilibria. When we move to the laboratory, the
substantive assumptions of such theories should be maintained, but technical restrictions
should be relaxed.
Following this methodological strategy, we conducted a multilateral bargaining experiment
involving payoffs that occur repeatedly. Players were free to make proposals and agree to
existing proposals at any time. In order to facilitate quick and intuitive decision making,
and allow for a reasonably long time horizon within each game while keeping playing time
short enough for many games to be played and learning to occur, we designed a simple
graphical interface involving a clickable simplex representation of the bargaining set.
One of the primary purposes of this exercise was to provide stylized facts to inform the-
oretical work. Our results have established a set of patterns which theories of repeated
coalition formation should predict:
1. Fair, or focal, outcomes predominate in terms of frequency and stability.
2. When all players receive a non-zero payoff, the division is likely to be equal.
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3. When play centers around majoritarian outcomes, asymmetric divisions within the
coalition are common.
4. The making and accepting of proposals tends to be consistent with myopic payoff-
maximization.
5. Subjects often forgo short-term gain in favor of remaining in a stable division.
Our analysis is also suggestive of the kinds of assumptions that might generate these
patterns. First, the frequency of even three-way splits, and loyalty in the rejection of
some tempting offers suggest that fairness concerns and reciprocity motives are important.
Second, increasing loyalty over the duration of a given coalition suggest that a Markov
assumption on transitions, as is commonly used in theoretical work (e.g. Konishi and
Ray, 2003), may be inappropriate. Third, the importance of fair and focal outcomes may
be further explained by risk aversion and self-fulfilling beliefs about the stability of these
divisions.
One of the contributions of this paper was to develop a simple interface for computer-
mediated multilateral bargaining experiments. An important feature of our program is
that it is time-efficient, requiring only a brief tutorial for subjects to understand its use,
and allowing for a rapid exchange of offers and acceptances. The numerous learning effects
we identify highlight the importance of designing experiments that allow for a reasonable
number of repetitions to enable subjects to come to grips with a complex strategic environ-
ment. In this paper we have used the program to investigate a repeated environment with
symmetric players, but it can easily be adjusted to look at other questions. In another
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experiment we have modified the program to implement a one-off division in an infinite
horizon framework to test the robustness of experimental findings obtained using the
Baron-Ferejohn framework. Future work will consider situations involving heterogeneous
preferences and asymmetric information.
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A Instructions
Subjects received both printed and onscreen instructions. Onscreen instructions involved
a tutorial in which subjects could try out the software used in the experiment.
Onscreen Instructions (1)
The first screen contained the following text.
In this experiment, participants will interact in groups of three. The interaction will be repeated a number
of times. In what follows, we will call each repetition of the interaction a “round”.
During each round, the three members of a group will distribute 3600 points between themselves.
The points you receive will determine how much money you earn at the end of the experiment.
In addition to the money you earn during the interactions, you will also receive 3 Euros for filling in a
questionnaire.
In order to help you understand exactly how the interactions work, we will now demonstrate the functioning
of the program on your screen.
There will be a short tutorial followed by two practice rounds.
In the tutorial you will be shown the screen that will be used during the real rounds. How to understand
this screen and use it to interact with the other participants in your group is explained to you in the
printed instructions you have been given.
During this tutorial and the two practice rounds which follow no money will be awarded. The purpose of
this tutorial is only to help you understand how the program works. You will be informed before the real
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interactions begin.
Please follow the printed instructions carefully. It is important to understand how the program works!
PLEASE CLICK ”CONTINUE” IF YOU ARE READY TO BEGIN THE TUTORIAL
Printed Instructions
The following instructions were provided in hardcopy. The tutorial exercises were con-
ducted onscreen while reading the instructions. See Figure 1 for a screen shot.
Tutorial: DO NOT CLICK CONTINUE UNTIL YOU HAVE COMPLETED AND UNDERSTOOD THE
EXERCISES BELOW.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND AND SOMEONE WILL COME TO
ASSIST YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
• The participants in your group must decide how many points each will receive at any moment in
time. A total of 12 points can be allocated every second.
• On your screen, you will see small circles arranged in the form of a large triangle. Each circle
represents a different way of allocating the 12 points among you and the other two participants you
are interacting with in a given round.
• The corners of the triangle are labeled “You”, “Participant A”, and “Participant B”.
• The points in the corners correspond to allocations in which the indicated participant receives all
12 points, while the others receive no points.
• The closer a point is to a given corner, the more the corresponding allocation assigns to that
participant.
• If you move your mouse over a circle, the corresponding points to be allocated to each subject are
displayed in the appropriate corners of the triangle.
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• Exercise:
– Move your mouse around the triangle until you understand how the circles are arranged.
– Click on a point to select it. Notice that the selected point is circled in green (for now, do not
click on the circles that are already marked).
– Click on a point outside the triangle. The green circle should disappear.
– During the real interactions, when you click on a circle this will be shown on the screens of
the two other participants you are interacting with, and it will disappear from their screens
if you click outside the triangle. If two participants have their circles showing on the same
circle, points will start to be distributed according to this division. This is explained in more
detail below.
• During the real interactions, any of the three participants (including you) may click on any circle
at any time.
• When you click on a circle, the other two participants in your group will see this circle marked on
their screen.
• When another participant in your group clicks on a circle on their screen, it will be marked on
your screen in the color corresponding to that participant: orange for“Participant A” blue for
“Participant B”. You can see how this looks now on your screen.
• Clicking on an unmarked circle is like suggesting that division.
• Clicking on a circle marked by another participant is like (temporarily) accepting the division they
have suggested.
• When another participant clicks on a circle you have marked, they have (temporarily) accepted your
suggestion.
• Points are distributed for as long as at least two members of a group select the same circle in the
triangle.
• These agreements are not permanent and can be changed, as any participant can click on another
circle at any time.
• If at least two participants are simultaneously choosing the same circle, the corresponding point
allocation is implemented: each second, each participant receives the number of points assigned to
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them. All subjects will temporarily stop receiving points if subjects click on different circles such
that all members of the group are now selecting different circles.
• The points a participant receives do not depend on whether she herself has selected the circle being
implemented. In particular, it is possible that a subject who has clicked on the circle receives no
points, and that a subject who has not clicked on the circle receives points. The allocation of points
depends only on the location of the point in the triangle, not on the subjects that are selecting it
(as long as there are at least two).
• In this tutorial there is no limit to the number of the points you can distribute. This is so you have
time to understand how the program works. In the real interactions the round will end when 360
points have been distributed among you and the other two participants in your group.
• Exercise:
– On your screen, the computer has randomly selected two circles on behalf of your hypothetical
group partners.
– Experiment by clicking on each of these circles, as well as other circles.
– Watch how your points accumulate when you select the same circle as another group member,
and how points stop accumulating when you subsequently click on a circle different from those
selected by either of your partners. (Naturally, points are also allocated whenever the other
two members of your group select the same circle. In that case, the points you receive will
not depend on which circle you are selecting.)
– Notice that an agreed / active circle is highlighted in red, and that the shares of points that
correspond to the agreed circle appear in large red font at the appropriate corners when your
mouse is outside the triangle.
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS AND COMPLETED THE
EXERCISES, PLEASE CLICK CONTINUE.
THIS TUTORIAL WILL BE FOLLOWED BY TWO PRACTICE ROUNDS, AND YOU WILL HAVE
THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FURTHER QUESTIONS BEFORE THE REAL ROUNDS BEGIN.
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Onscreen Instructions (2)
After completing the turorial using the printed instructions, the following screen was
displayed.
There will now be two practice rounds.
During these practice rounds you will be interacting with the computer. The divisions the computer
chooses will be random. Everything else will be the same as in the real rounds which will follow.
There will be three differences between the previous screen and the practice (and real) rounds:
• The divisions chosen by ”Participant A” and ”Participant B” will move as they click on different
circles. Sometimes you will not see their circles on the triangle: this is when they have not yet
clicked on a circle, or have clicked off the triangle.
• There are only 360 points to be awarded. When these points have run out the round will end. The
number of points remaining to be distributed will be shown next to the number of points you have
currently received (check this on the picture on the last page of printed instructions).
• If not all points have been distributed after 300 seconds, the round will end automatically and any
remaining points will be lost. The number of seconds remaining before the round ends automatically
will be shown below the triangle (check this on the picture on the last page of printed instructions).
You will have an opportunity to ask questions after each of the two practice rounds.
During these practice rounds, no money will be awarded. The purpose of the practice rounds is only to
help you understand how the program works. You will be informed before the real interactions begin.
It is more important during the practice rounds to learn to understand how the program works than to
get the division of points that you want.
You may now ask questions about the way the program works, however please do not ask questions about
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strategies and divisions you or the computer may use. These types of questions will not be answered.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and ask it quietly when an experimenter comes.
If you have no questions, please click “Continue” and wait for the first practice round to begin.
38
References
Anbarci, N. and N. Feltovich (2013). How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes
in disagreement payoffs? Experimental economics 16 (4), 560–596.
Aumann, R. J. (1961). The core of a cooperative game without side payments. Transac-
tions of the American Mathematical Society , 539–552.
Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler (1961). The bargaining set for cooperative games. Defense
Technical Information Center.
Baron, D. P. and J. A. Ferejohn (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. The American Political
Science Review , 1181–1206.
Battaglini, M. and T. R. Palfrey (2012). The dynamics of distributive politics. Economic
Theory 49 (3), 739–777.
Becker, A., T. Deckers, T. Dohmen, A. Falk, and F. Kosse (2012). The relationship
between economic preferences and psychological personality measures.
Davis, M. and M. Maschler (1965). The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research
Logistics Quarterly 12 (3), 223–259.
Diermeier, D., R. I. Swaab, V. H. Medvec, and M. C. Kern (2008). The micro-dynamics
of coalition formation. Political Research Quarterly 61 (3), 484–501.
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, J. Schupp, and G. G. Wagner (2011).
Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences.
Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (3), 522–550.
39
Fiorina, M. P. and C. R. Plott (1978). Committee decisions under majority rule: An
experimental study. The American Political Science Review , 575–598.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental economics 10 (2), 171–178.
Frechette, G., J. H. Kagel, and M. Morelli (2005). Nominal bargaining power, selection
protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining. Journal of Public Economics 89 (8),
1497–1517.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic
perspectives, 25–42.
Greiner, B. (2004). An online recruitment system for economic experiments.
Horowitz, A. D. (1977). A test of the core, bargaining set, kernel and shapley models in
n-person quota games with one weak player. Theory and decision 8 (1), 49–65.
Kahan, J. P. and R. A. Helwig (1971). Coalitions: A system of programs for computer-
controlled bargaining games. General Systems 16, 31–41.
Kahan, J. P. and A. Rapoport (1974). Test of the bargaining set and kernel models in
three-person games. Springer.
Kalandrakis, A. (2004). A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game. Journal
of Economic Theory 116 (2), 294–322.
Kalisch, G., J. Milnor, J. Nash, and E. Nering (1996). Some experimental n-person games.
Essays on Game Theory , 61.
40
Konishi, H. and D. Ray (2003). Coalition formation as a dynamic process. Journal of
Economic Theory 110 (1), 1–41.
McKelvey, R. D. (1991). An experimental test of a stochastic game model of committee
bargaining. Laboratory Research in Political Economy, T. Palfrey ed. University of
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor , 139–69.
Miller, L. and C. Vanberg (2013). Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental
analysis. Public Choice 155 (3-4), 373–394.
Nagarajan, M. and G. Sosˇic´ (2008). Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply
chain agents: Review and extensions. European Journal of Operational Research 187 (3),
719–745.
Nash, J. F., R. Nagel, A. Ockenfels, and R. Selten (2012). The agencies method for
coalition formation in experimental games. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 109 (50), 20358–20363.
Nolutshungu, S. C. (1996). Limits of anarchy: Intervention and state formation in Chad.
University of Virginia Press.
Norman, P. (2002). Legislative bargaining and coalition formation. Journal of Economic
Theory 102 (2), 322–353.
Rammstedt, B. and O. P. John (2007). Measuring personality in one minute or less: A
10-item short version of the big five inventory in english and german. Journal of research
in Personality 41 (1), 203–212.
41
Rapoport, A. and J. P. Kahan (1976). When three is not always two against one: Coali-
tions in experimental three-person cooperative games. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 12 (3), 253–273.
Roth, A. E. (1995). Introduction to experimental economics. In J. Kagel and A. Roth
(Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics, pp. 3–110. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Schmeidler, D. (1969). The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on
applied mathematics 17 (6), 1163–1170.
Shapley, L. S. (1952). A value for n-person games. Technical report, DTIC Document.
42
